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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated (1992) and Rule 5 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court correctly denied Petitioner's 
Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court? The 
applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion. Olympia 
Sales Company v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979); Estate of 
Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 (Utah 1978). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U.C.A. S 78-6-1 (1992) is set out in full in 
Addendum A. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) The Circuit Court . . . may create a 
department known as the "Small Claims 
Department" which has jurisdiction in cases: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount 
claimed does not exceed $2,000, including 
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and 
interest and where the defendant resides or 
the action of indebtedness was incurred within 
the jurisdiction of the court in which the 
action is to be maintained. 
B, U.C.A. § 78-13-1 (1992) is set out in full in 
Addendum B. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Actions for the following causes must be tried 
in the county in which the subject of the 
action, or some part thereof, is situated . . 
. (1) . . . for injuries to real property. 
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C. U.C.A. § 78-13-4 (1992) is set out in full in 
Addendum C It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When the defendant has signed a contract in 
the state to perform an obligationf an action 
on the contract may be commenced in the 
following venues: (2) . . • in the 
county where such obligation is to be 
performed, the contract was signed, oT in 
which the defendant resides. 
D. U.C.A. S 78-13-7 (1992) is set out in full in 
Addendum D. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
In all other cases, the action must be tried 
in the county in which the cause of action 
arises, or in the county in which the 
defendant resides at the commencement of the 
action. 
E. U.C.A. § 78-13-8 (1992) provides as follows: 
If the county in which the action is 
commenced is not the proper county for the 
trial thereof, the action may nevertheless be 
tried therein, unless the defendant at the 
tiiae he answers or otherwise appears files a 
motion, in writing, that the trial be had in 
the proper county. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Petitioner R. M. Jensen, also known as Richard M. 
Jensen ("Jensen") appeals from the Order Denying Defendant's 
(Jensen) Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court, 
signed by the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, on September 9, 1992. 
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On appeal, Jensen contends the trial court erred in 
denying the motion to change venue. To support this contention, 
Jensen argues (1) as a matter of lawf venue should have been 
changed to Box Elder County, which is in the First Judicial 
District; and (2) venue should have been changed to the First 
Judicial District in the interest of justice and convenience of 
witnesses. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondent Moab Building Center, Inc., a Utah 
corporation ("Moab Building Center") filed a Small Claims 
Affidavit and Order (the "Small Claims Affidavit")in the Small 
Claims Department ("Small Claims Department") of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, Grand County, Utah ("Seventh District 
Court") on August 13, 1992. The Small Claims Affidavit alleged 
that Jensen owed Moab Building Center $733.65 plus $20.00 filing 
fee, for building materials (the "Materials") purchased from Moab 
Building Center by Jensen. 
By separate documents dated August 31, 1993 and filed 
in the Seventh District Court, on September 14, 1993, Jensen: 
1* Counterclaimed for $11,275.00 in property and 
punitive damages; 
2. Moved to transmit the case from the Small 
Claims Department to the Seventh District Court; and 
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3. Moved to change venue from the Seventh 
District Court to the First District Court, Box Elder County, 
Utah ("First District Court"). 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
On September 9, 1993, before the time expired for Moab 
Building Center to file its objection to the motion to change 
venue, Judge Halliday denied Jensen's Motion to Change Venue to 
the First District Court. The Order Denying Defendant's (Jensen) 
Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court (Addendum E) 
was signed by the Court on Wednesday, September 9, 1992, and 
filed on Monday, September 14, 1992. Jensen appealed the trial 
court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court which poured the case 
over to this court. 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Because this case originated as a small claims action, 
there are no complaint, answer and counterclaim setting out the 
allegations of the parties. There has been no trial determining 
which allegations are true. The statement of facts in 
appellant's brief is accordingly unsupported by any citations to 
the record. However, Moab Building Center accepts the Statement 
of Facts as a statement of the facts as Jensen would allege them 
if an answer and counterclaim were filed. This is not to say 
Moab Building Center accepts all of Jensen's statement of facts 
as true. Moab Building Center accepts some of those facts and 
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disputes others. The correct statement of admitted and disputed 
facts follows: 
1. On May 18, 1992, Jensen contacted Moab 
Building Center in Grand County, Utah and requested the delivery 
of the Materials to a building site in Blanding, San Juan County, 
Utah, where Jensen was building a home. 
2. Moab Building Center delivered the Materials 
in Blanding, San Juan County, Utah, on May 21, 1992. 
3. Jensen claims that Moab Building Center 
damaged the driveway where he was building a home when the 
Materials were delivered. Moab Building Center disputes this. 
4. Jensen claims Moab Building Center agreed to 
pay for the damage to the driveway, and the damage was 
&11,275.20. Moab Building Center disputes this. 
5. Moab Building Center filed this action to 
collect for the delivered Materials. 
6. Jensen filed his counteraffidavit (the 
"Counterclaim") to recover for the alleged damage to the 
driveway. 
7. In addition to the Motion for Change of Venue 
to the First District Court (Record at 6-7)f Jensen filed the 
following at the same time Jensen filed the motion for change of 
venue: 
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a. The Counterclaim in the Small Claims 
Department denying Jensen owed Moab Building Center $753.65 and 
asserting a counterclaim for $11,275.00 in property and punitive 
damages (Record at 3); 
b. A motion to transmit the dispute from the 
Small Claims Department to the Seventh District Court.1 
8. The Counterclaim appears to be Jensen's 
attempt to collect for the alleged damage to the driveway. 
9. On September 9, 1992, the Small Claims 
Department granted the motion to transmit to the Seventh District 
Court (Record at 2) and denied Jensen's Motion to Change Venue to 
the First District Court (Record at 8-9). 
10. On February 3, 1993, Moab Building Center 
filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and for Change of Venue. The 
motion for change of venue states Moab Building Center has no 
objection to changing venue to San Juan County, Utah (Record at 
68-73) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. VENUE IS PROPER IN GRAND COUNTY. 
U.C.A. § 78-6-1 allows a small claims case to be filed 
in a small claims department in the county where the actions 
which gave rise to the indebtedness occurred. All of the actions 
*For some reason this motion is not part of the record. 
Jensen included this motion as part of his brief as Exhibit "D" 
and Moab Building Center includes it as ADDENDUM F. 
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which gave rise to the indebtedness, which is the subject of this 
action, occurred in Grand County. The Small Claims Department 
was a proper forum for Moab Building Center to file the Small 
Claims Affidavit and the denial of Jensen's motion to change 
venue was correct. 
II. JENSEN WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO 
CHANGE VENUE. 
If Jensen had any right to change venue (Moab Building 
Center contends Jensen had no right), Jensen waived the right. 
Jensen was required to make a motion to change venue at his first 
appearance and before making other motions. Because Jensen made 
other motions before making the motion to change venue, Jensen 
waived any right he had to object to venue. 
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, VENUE IS PROPER IN SAN 
JUAN COUNTY. 
The Counterclaim of Jensen asked for monetary relief in 
excess of the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Department, thus 
making a motion to transmit to the Seventh District Court 
necessary. If because the Counterclaim is what removed the 
dispute to the district court we look at the Counterclaim for 
proper venue, venue is proper in San Juan County and Grand 
County. The Counterclaim is for injury to real property located 
in San Juan County and actions on injury to real property must be 
tried where the real property is located. Grand County could 
retain venue because it had venue under the Small Claims 
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Affidavit. 
IV. THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND CONVENIENCE OF 
WITNESSES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Jensen argues venue should be changed for the interest 
of justice and convenience of witnesses. This argument was not 
presented to the trial court and should not be considered by this 
court. In addition, Jensen does not tell the court why his view 
of interest of justice and convenience is better than the current 
circumstances. 
V. JENSEN CITES AUTHORITY WHICH DOES NOT SUPPORT 
HIS PROPOSITIONS AND ARGUES IRRELEVANT MATERIAL. 
For many of Jensen's arguments, he cites case law which 
does not support his contentions or are not controlling law. In 
additionf most of Jensen's arguments state and argue material 
which are irrelevant to this disposition of this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VENUE IS PROPER IN GRAND COUNTY. 
I.A. Under U.C.A. § 78-6-1, venue is proper in 
Grand County. 
The venue statutes for a court of general jurisdiction 
are found in U.C.A. § 78-13-1 et seq. (the "General Venue 
Statutes"). District courts in the state of Utah have statewide 
jurisdiction. Utah Const. Art. VIIIf § 5; U.C.A. § 78-3-4(1) 
(1992). The General Venue Statutes, however, may require a 
district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction where venue 
lies elsewhere. 
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In contrast to the district courtr the jurisdiction of 
a small claims department and its venue are coterminous. The 
jurisdiction statute of the small claims department is found in 
U.C.A. §78-6-1 (the "Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute"), which 
states: "[T]he Small Claims Department . . . has jurisdiction in 
cases: (a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed 
does not exceed $2f000 . . . and where the defendant resides or 
the action of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction 
of the court . . . ." U.C.A. §78-6-1 (1992) (emphasis added). A 
small claims department has jurisdiction only over those matters 
specified in the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute. 
The General Venue Statutes are inapplicable in a small 
claims department and the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute 
supercedes the General Venue Statutes in a small claims case. 
Otherwise there is no need for the Small Claims Jurisdiction 
Statute and the portion of U.C.A. § 78-6-1 which states: "[W]here 
the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred 
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to be 
maintained" is duplicative of the General Venue Statutes and does 
not make any sense. 
In this case, Jensen contacted Moab Building Center at 
Moab Building Center's sole place of business in Grand County and 
ordered the Materials. Grand County is the location in which the 
Moab Building Center agreed to sell, and from which it shipped, 
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the Materials. Since the value of the Materials is less than 
$2,000.00, the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute is the statute 
which governed the filing of the Small Claims Affidavit. Since 
the actions giving rise to the indebtedness occurred in Grand 
County, Moab Building Center chose the proper venue and Jensen's 
motion for change of venue was properly denied by the trial 
court. 
Jensen asks this Court to decide that because he was in 
Brigham City at the time he made the telephone call for the 
Materials, the actions giving rise to the indebtedness occurred 
in Box Elder County. The placing of the phone call was the only 
action which occurred in Box Elder County. However, the placing 
of a phone call does not give rise to indebtedness. It was not 
until acts were performed by Moab Building Center, none of which 
occurred in Box Elder County, any indebtedness arose. The offer 
of Jensen was accepted, and the contract formed, in Grand County. 
I.B. Under the General Venue Statutes, venue is 
proper in Grand County. 
Even if the Court decides the Small Claims Jurisdiction 
Statute does not supercede the General Venue Statutes, and that 
somehow the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute and the General 
Venue Statutes must be read together, venue is proper in Grand 
County. The proper venue statute is found in U.C.A. § 78-13-7 
which states: "In all other cases the action must be tried in 
the county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county 
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in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action 
• . . ." U.C.A. § 78-13-7 (1992). 
Under the General Venue Statutes this case could be 
tried in either Grand County, where the cause of action arose2 or 
in Box Elder County where the defendant resides. Since Moab 
Building Center chose a county of proper venue, the court was 
correct in denying Jensen's motion for change of venue, even 
though the motion asked the court to change venue to another 
proper county. Hale v. Barker, 259 P.2d 928 (Utah 1927). 
At this point, Moab Building Center points out the case 
of Olvmpia Sales Co. v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979) which 
Jensen cites in his brief. In Olympia, the court stated, "It is 
therefore the conclusion of this court that actions upon contract 
not in writing, upon proper and timely demand being made, must be 
tried in the county where one of the defendants resides at the 
commencement of the action". Ici. at 921. Olvmpia interprets the 
predecessor of U.C.A. § 78-13-43 as it was written prior to its 
amendment in 1990. Under the prior statute the court seemed to 
2See argument set forth in I.A above. 
3Prior to 1990, U.C.A. § 78-13-4 stated: 
When the defendant has contracted in writing 
to perform an obligation in a particular 
county of the state and resides in another 
county, an action on such contract, 
obligation may be commenced and tried in the 
county where such obligation is to be 
performed or in which the defendant resides. 
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say an action of any contract, written or oral, other than when 
the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation 
in particular place,4 venue is only proper in the county in which 
the defendant resides. In other words, unless the contract 
specifies in writing a place of performance, venue is only proper 
in the county in which the defendant resides. 
Moab Building Center contends that Olympia is not 
controlling law on this point because it interprets a prior law. 
Since the decision in Olympia, the legislature has amended and 
clarified U.C.A. § 78-13-4. The statute, as amended in 1990, is 
quite different than its predecessor which Olympia interpreted. 
It is clear that U.C.A. § 78-13-4, as it now reads,5 applies only 
to a contract signed in the State of Utah to perform an 
obligation. Thus the clear meaning of the statute is that the 
applicability of Section 78-13-4 is limited to contracts signed 
in the State of Utah. If a contract was signed in the State of 
Utah, then Section 78-13-4 operates to determine where venue is 
proper. In this case there is no contract which was signed in 
the state, therefore, Section 78-13-4 is not applicable and any 
case interpreting section 78-13-4 or it predecessors is not 
controlling law. 
4Moab Building Center believes this to mean the place of 
performance is specifically designated in writing in the 
contract. 
5See Addendum C for full text. 
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II, JENSEN WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO CHANGE 
VENUE. 
Even if venue under the Small Claims Affidavit is not 
in Grand County, Jensen waived any right to change venue. 
U.R.C.P. 12(b) requires that a motion for improper venue "shall 
be made before pleading if further pleading is permitted." 
U.R.C.P. 12(b) (1992) (emphasis added). In Rudd v. Crown 
International, 488 P.2d 298 (Utah 1971) the Court said, "Section 
78-13-8 . . . requires a defendant to file a motion for change of 
venue at his first appearance. Making any other motion or 
appearance prior thereto usually forecloses defendant from 
thereafter objecting to venue." .Id. at 301 (emphasis added); 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Utah 1991). By reading 
U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P. 12(b), Rudd and Johnson together (and 
the only way in which the statutes, rules of procedure, and case 
law harmonize), it is clear a motion for change of venue must be 
filed before any other motion or pleading. 
In this case, Jensen's motion for change of venue was 
not filed before his other motions or pleadings. Jensen's motion 
for change of venue asked the Seventh District Court to change 
venue to the First District Court. In order for the Seventh 
District Court to rule on Jensen's Motion for Change of Venue, 
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the Counterclaim6 and the Motion to Transmit to District Court 
had to have been filed first. Jensen's motion to transmit asked 
the Small Claims Department to transmit to the Seventh District 
Court. Neither the Counterclaim nor the motion to transmit made 
a motion for change of venue. Therefore, Jensen did not file his 
motion to change venue in a timely and proper manner as required 
by U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P. 12, Rudd and Johnson, and therefore 
waived any right Jensen may have had to change venue. 
The proper procedure under U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P. 
12 (b) and Rudd, in order not to waive any right to change venue, 
would have been for Jensen to file a motion to change venue in 
the Small Claims Department and obtain a ruling on the same prior 
to filing the Counterclaim and the Motion to Transmit to the 
District Court. This is clearly the proper procedure 
contemplated by U.R.C.P. 12(a) when it states? 
The service of a motion under this rule alters 
these periods of time7 as follows, unless a 
different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion8 . . . the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action. 
U.R.C.P. 12(b)(1992). 
6Which monetary claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the Small 
Claims Department, thus making the Motion to Transmit to District 
Court necessary. 
7Time periods for filing answers, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, etc. 
8A motion for a change of venue (improper venue) is one of 
the many motions to which this term applies. See U.R.C.P. 12 (b) 
(1993) . 
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The denial of Jensen's motion for change of venue was 
proper because Jensen, by his own actions, waived any right to 
change venue. 
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, VENUE IS PROPER IN SAN JUAN COUNTY. 
Under the Small Claims Affidavit, if the action of 
indebtedness was not incurred in Grand County (where the 
Materials were ordered and shipped) it most certainly was 
incurred in San Juan County where the Materials were delivered, 
the Invoice was presented and accepted, and the Check delivered. 
Under no circumstances did the actions which gave rise to the 
indebtedness occur in Box Elder County. 
The Counterclaim is separate and distinct from the 
Small Claims Affidavit and is essentially an independent cause of 
action. Although both might be viewed as arising out of the same 
set of facts when viewed as a whole, the evidence to support each 
claim is separate and distinct. The Small Claims Affidavit is 
under a contract and Jensen's failure to perform his obligation 
thereunder. On the other hand, the Counterclaim appears to be a 
claim for injury to real property, a tort. Evidence which 
supports or negates the claims of Moab Building Center for 
payment have little or no relevancy to the claims of Jensen for 
injury to real property. 
The filing of the Counterclaim and the granting of the 
motion to transmit to the Seventh District Court removed the 
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dispute from the Small Claims Department to the Seventh District 
Court, If, because the Counterclaim is the act which removed the 
dispute to the Seventh District Court, we therefore look at where 
venue is proper under the Counterclaim, then U.C.A. §78-13-1 is 
the governing venue statute for injuries to real property. 
U.C.A. §78-13-1 states: "Actions for the following causes must 
be tried in the county in which the subject of the action or some 
part thereof is situated . . . (1) . . . injuries to real 
property." U.C.A. §78-13-1 (1992). Under this statute the 
proper place for venue, if determined by looking at the 
Counterclaim, is in the place where the "subject of the action" 
(the real property) is, which is San Juan County. Therefore, 
Jensen's motion for change of venue was properly denied because 
venue is not in Box Elder County but rather under the 
Counterclaim venue is only proper in San Juan County. Under this 
scenario Grand County would retain venue for the Counterclaim 
because venue was proper in Grand County with regards to the 
Small Claims Affidavit. 
IV. THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND CONVENIENCE OF WITNESSES 
DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
The second part of Jensen's argument is his motion for 
change of venue should have been granted in the interest of 
justice and convenience. This argument was not presented to the 
trial court by Jensen as a reason to change venue (See Record at 
6-7). It is well settled law that issues cannot be raised on 
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appeal for the first time. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of 
Educ., 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990); Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 
(Utah 1984); Olson v. Park - Craig - Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 
(Utah App. 1991); Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 
1350 (Utah App. 1990). Therefore, this argument of Jensen's 
should not be considered by this Court. 
However, if this Court should decide to consider this 
argument, this argument is unpersuasive. Jensen arguesf in point 
4, that the "interest of justice would not be served by forcing 
[Jensen] to travel to a distant county to trial." However, 
Jensen contends it is in the interest of justice to force Moab 
Building Center to travel to a distant county to trial. Jensen 
appears to adopt a double-standard. 
In point 4, Jensen also argues that the convenience of 
witnesses requires a change of venue. Jensen alleges "witnesses 
are all residing in Box Elder or Salt Lake County and forcing 
them to travel to Grand County would create a hardship on them". 
This may or may not be true for the witnesses Jensen intends to 
use at the trial but is a false statement for the witnesses which 
Moab Building Center may decide to use. In fact, most, if not 
all, of the witnesses which Moab Building Center may use at trial 
live in Grand or San Juan County. 
Jensen wants this court to adopt his view of what is in 
the interest of justice and convenience for him, without regards 
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to the injustice or inconvenience it would cause to Moab Building 
Center, Moab Building Center did not go to Box Elder County 
seeking to do business with Jensen. Jensen came to Grand County 
and asked Moab Building Center to deliver material to San Juan 
County. 
V. JENSEN CITES AUTHORITY WHICH DOES NOT SUPPORT 
HIS PROPOSITIONS AND ARGUES IRRELEVANT MATERIAL. 
In point 2 and point 3 of the argument in Jensen's 
brief, Jensen cites Palfreyman v. Trueman, 142 P.2d 677 (Utah 
1943) for the proposition that "contracts are required to be in 
writing". Palfreyman in no way supports or eludes to this idea. 
To accept such an idea would make moot a whole body of contract 
law dealing with oral agreements. Palfreyman interprets the 
predecessor to U.C.A. § 78-13-4.9 
In point 3 of the argument in Jensen's brief, Jensen 
cites Palfreyman. for the proposition that a motion for change of 
venue to defendant's place of residence must be granted if no 
objection is raised. In Palfreyman the court found the facts 
justified the venue change because the original claim was filed 
in a county of improper venue and a motion was made to change to 
a county of proper venue. There was no discussion on the impact 
of the lack of an objection. There is no requirement in the law 
that if no objection to a motion is made, the court is required 
9See discussion under Argument I.B. 
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to grant the motion, A court can only grant a proper motion and 
cannot grant an improper motion even if no objection is made. 
For example, it makes sense for a court to grant a motion for 
change of venue from a court of improper venue to a court of 
proper venue. It does not make sense to require a court to grant 
a motion for change of venue from a court of proper venue to a 
court of improper venue or even to another court of proper venue 
unless the extraordinary circumstances of Section 78-13-9(2)(3) 
or (4) are met. Jensen has tried to argue but has not shown 
these extraordinary circumstances exist in this case. 
In point 5 Jensen states "Denying the motion prior to 
the period for objections has run, is arbitrary. Jensen makes 
this conclusion without citing any authority or explaining to the 
court why the action is arbitrary. Jensen wants the court to 
adopt his conclusions without providing the court with any 
authority or reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Grand County should be affirmed. 
Alternatively, if venue is to change at all, it should be changed 
to San Juan County where the materials were delivered, and where 
Jensen's alleged injury occurred. 
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DATED the 1st day of July, 
L. Robert Anderson 
Daniel G. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Respondent 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone (801) 587-2222 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July, 1993, I 
mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent by first-
class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard M. Jensen 
115 North 500 West 
Brigham City, Utah 843 
Daniel G. Anderson 
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ADDENDUM A 
78-6-1. CREATION -- JURISDICTION — BIANNUAL REVIEW --
COUNSEL NOT NECESSARY — DEFERRING MULTIPLE CLAIMS OF 
ONE PLAINTIFF — SUPREME COURT TO GOVERN PROCEDURES. 
(1) The circuit court shall andf if certified by the 
Judicial Council, the justice court may create a department known 
as the "Small Claims Department" which has jurisdiction in cases: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount 
claimed does not exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but 
exclusive of court costs and interest and where the 
defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred 
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is 
to be maintained; or 
(b) involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the amount claimed 
does not exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but exclusive 
Of court costs and interest. 
(2) In no event shall the judgment of the small claims 
division exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but exclusive of 
court costs and interest. 
(3) Counter claims may be maintained in the small 
claims division if the counter claim arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
plaintiff's claim. A counter claim may not be raised for the 
first time in the trial de novo of the small claims action. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall present to the 
Judiciary Interim Committee prior to the general session of the 
Legislature during odd-numbered years a report and 
recommendations concerning the jurisdiction of the small claims 
A-l 
department. 
(5) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on 
behalf of themselves in person or through authorized employees 
with or without counsel* 
(6) If a person or corporation other than a 
municipality or a political subdivision of the state files 
multiple small claims in any one court, the clerk or judge of the 
court may remove all but the initial claim from the court•s 
calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims matters. 
Claims so removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the 
court's calendar• 
(7) Small claims shall be managed in accordance with 




78-13-1. ACTIONS RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY. 
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the 
county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, 
is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the 
place of trial as provided in this code: 
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an 
estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any 
form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real 
property, 
(2) For the partition of real property. 
(3) For the foreclosure of all liens and 
mortgages on real property. 
Where the real property is situated partly in one 
county and partly in another, the plaintiff may select either of 
the counties, and the county so selected is the proper county for 
the trial of such action. 
B-l 
ADDENDUM C 
78-13-4. ACTIONS ON WRITTEN CONTRACTS. 
When the defendant has signed a contract in the state 
to perform an obligation, an action on the contract may be 
commenced and tried in the following venues: 
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in 
real property securing a consumer's obligation the action 
may be brought only in the county where the real property is 
located or where the defendant resides. 
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than 
under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where such 
obligation is to be performed, the contract was signed, or 
in which the defendant resides. 
C-l 
ADDENDUM D 
78-13-7. ALL OTHER ACTIONS. 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county in 
which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action; 
provided, that if any such defendant is a corporation, any county 
in which such corporation has its principal office or place of 
business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation 
resides within the meaning of this section. If none of the 
defendants resides in this state, such action may be commenced 
and tried in any county which the plaintiff may designate in his 
complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart from the 
state, such action may be tried in any county where any of the 
parties resides or service is had, subject, however, to the power 
of the court to change the place of trial as provided by law. 
D-l 
ADDENDUM E 
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE TO THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
Richard M. Jensen, Pro Se 
115 North 5th West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone (801) 723-6194 
fm
 * > ' 4 092 
couflr 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
GRAND COUNTY 
115 WEST 200 SOUTH, MOAB, UTAH, 84532 
°*PUty 
T MOAB BUILDING CENTER, INC., 





MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE TO 
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
civil HO.VJ*?-?/ 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Richard M. Jensen, moves the Seventh 
District Court to change the place of the trial for the above 
mentioned action to the First District Court for the following 
reasons: 
1. That Defendant resides in Brigham City, Box Elder County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That Box Elder County is within the jurisdiction of the 
First District Court. 
3. That the contract arose within the jurisdiction of the 
First District Court. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1992 
Pro Se 
E-l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of August, 1992, I 
personally deposited with the United States Postal Service, First 







MOTION TO TRANSMIT TO DISTRICT COURT 
Richard M. Jensen, Pro Se 
115 North 5th West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone (801) 723-6194 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH CL2HK OF THE COURT 
GRAND COUNTY BY 
115 WEST 200 SOUTH, MOAB, UTAH, 84 532 ^ ^ 
SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
MOAB BUILDING CENTER, 






1 MOTION TO TRANSMIT TO 
) DISTRICT COURT 
i Case No. 9287-59 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Richard M. Jensen, pursuant to Rule 
13 (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moves the Small Claims 
Court to transmit to the District Court the above mentioned action 
for the following reasons: 
1. That Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff has filed a 
counterclaim in the amount of $11,275.00. 
2. That the amount prayed for by the Defendant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff is in excess of the jurisdiction of the 
amount allowed by the Utah Code, Annotated 1953, for small claims 
court. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1992 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
m
 SEP / y 1992 
F - l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of August, 1992, I 
personally deposited with the United States Postal Service, First 
Class Mail, Postage Paid, a true and correct copy of the above to 
the following: 
RICHARD C. HOVER, SEC. 
2471 South Highway 191 
Moab, Utah 84532 
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